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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

WINNETTA J. LLEWELYN, widow
of Isaiah J. Llewelyn,
deceased,
Plaintiff 0/nd A.pp~elZan.t,

vs.

THE IND·USTRrAL ·CO·MMIS;SION
OF UTAH, CTJAYTON INVE·STMENT COMPANY, and UNi'TED
·STATES FIDELITY AN·D GUARANTY ·COMPANY

Case No.

7166

'

Deferulants ami/, Respondernts.

BRIE·F OF

DEFE'ND·ANT~S

AND RIDSPONDENTIS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
(All italics, unless otherwise noted, are defendants')
It is deemed advisable to amplify, to a limited ex- .
tent, the statement of facts relative to dependency set
forth in plaintiff's brief.
The plaintiff obtained a .decree of separate maintenance from the deceased in 193!6 which ordered deceased to pay $·25.00 per month to plaintiff. The further
details of that decree are not in evidence, and there is
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nothing in the record to support the statement that the
decree contained a finding that the plaintiff in 19:36 was
dependent upon deceased, although th·e matter is not
properly relevant to this proceeding in any event. After
the decree in 1936, plaintiff and deceased no longer lived
together, and were not living together at the time of his
death on March 27, 1947.
During the five years preceding death, plaintiff received no money of any kind from .deceased, (Tr. 78),
and during the six previous years received $200 or $22·5,
which was all the money received during the period of
separation CTr. 78). After the separation in 19·36, plaintiff maintained a home and worked off· and on during
that time· in War Plants, laundries and other places at
a salary apparently averaging about $7·5 per month (Tr.
77) . The oldest son was in the· service, but during that
time he made no allotment because, as plaintiff stated,
('Tr. 7·9) "I was in War Work and didn't need it."
After returning from the service in 1944, that son purchased groceries for the house (Tr. 79) and claimant
lived with him thereafter (Tr. 80). The daughters from
time to time bought groceries and things of that typ·e
('Tr. 79)'.
1

ARGUMENT
The sole question p,resented by plaintiff's brief is
as to whether or not plaintiff was a ''dependent'' of the
deceased workman, Isaiah J. Llewelyn, a:t the time of his
death. We believe there is another question which merits
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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consideration, and that is as to whether or not the death
'v-as caused by injuries arising out of the course of employment, but for purposes of clarity that matter will be
argued at a later point in this brief.
It is noted that the Industrial Commission (Tr. 12.)
found that plaintiff 'vas not dependent upon deceased at
the time of his accidental injury and death, and it is
deemed advisable at the outset to briefly analyze the
extent and nature of any review that may be made by
the Supreme Court.on that finding.
In Kent vs. Industrial .Commission, 89 Utah 381,
57 P. 2d 724 (1936), the court stated at page 725:
''In the case of denial of compensation, the
record must disclose that there is material, substantial, competent, uncontradicted evidence sufficient to make a disregard of it justify the conclusion, as a matter of law, that the Industrial
Commission arbitrarily and cap-riciously disregarded the evidence or unreasonably refused to
believe such evidence. See Kavalinakis v. Ind.
Commission, 67 Utah 174, 246 P. ·698, and Gagos
v. Industrial Commission (Utah), 48 P. (2d) 449,
450."
That this rule is well settled is apparent in the
recent case of Woodburn vs. Industrial Commission, 181
P. 2d 209 (Utah-19·47), wherein the court cited with
appiroval the Kent case, supra, and also stated at page
212:
''In Lorange v. Industrial ·Commission, 107
Utah 261, 153 P. 2'd 272, 273, we quoted with
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

approval from Kavalinakis v. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah '174, 2'46 P. 698, as follows:
'Unless therefore it can he said, upon
the whole record, that the commission
clearly acted arbitrarily or capriciously in
making its findings and decision, this court
is powerless to interfere. . . . It was not
in tended, . . . that this court, in matters
of evidence, should to any extent substitute
its judgment for the judgment of the commission.' ''
It is also noted that dependency in the type of case
here involved has been held to be a question of fact to
be determined by the commission, not the reviewing
court. ·See Geo. A. Lowe ·Co. vs. Industrial ~Commission,
56 Utah '519, 190 Pac. 9"34 (1920).
The applicable rules of law by which dependency
in & case of this kind may 'be determined have, been stated
many times by this court. There is but one standard,
and that is as to whether or not the alleged dependent
has a reasonable expeetation of continuing or future support and maintenance. In· determining the ''reasonable
expectation'' there are, of course, a number of factors
to be given consideration, among which are the legal
obligation to support, pas~ contributions, action in anticipation of future contributions, and whether or not
applicant has means of support in substitution for the
anticipated contributions of deceased. O:f all of these
factors, logic and common sense would indicate that by
far the strongest and most controlling is the re·cord of
past contribution. We cannot agree with the theory
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advanced by plaintiff's brief that there are two criteria,
"reasonable expectation'' and "need plus legal duty",
since the cases clearly indicate that need and legal duty
are merely t""'"o of several factors which must be considered in determining reasonable expectation.
Applicable provisions from the controlling statute,
42-1-67 U.C.A. 194'3, read as follows:
''The following persons shall be p,resumed to be
wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee:
(1) A wife upon a husband with whom she lives
at the time of his death.

• • • •
In all other cases, the question of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be determined
in accordance with the facts in each p·articular
case existing at the time of the injury resulting
in the death of such employee .... ''
Since in the instant case plaintiff had not lived with
deceased for eleven years, and was not living with him
at time of death, subsection (1) is not ap·plicable, and
the case is controlled by the second quoted portion of
the statute.
'The standard by which dependency should be determined was laid down in the 1926 case of Utah Apex
Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 6·6 Utah 529', 244
Pac. 656. There applicant wife and deceased husband
were married at Blackfoot, Idaho, in 19'18, and after intermittently living together for several months, she went
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to her brother at Pocatello and worked at odd jobs until
192'2 when she went to her mother at Morehead, Kansas.
She remained there for about two years, supp;orting herself by canvassing, and returned to Price, Utah in 1924,
continuing to support herself in the same manner up to
her husband's death on May 12, 192~4, which death was
occasioned by a.n accident while employed by the Utah
Apex Mining Company. :she received no money from her
husband during most of this period, but did keep track
of him and stated that she would have gone back to live
with him and demanded his sup·port if he had been working. 'The order awarding comp·ensation was reversed
upon appeal.
'The court stated, p1age 657:

'' * * * And the burden of establishing dependency was upon the applicant. Utah Apex
Min. 'Co. vs. Ind. ·Com., 2·28 Pac. 1078, 64 Utah
22'1. It is. plainly deducible from the statute itself
that dependency is not presumed from or established by the existence of the legal relation of
the wife to the husband, unless they are living
together, and when, as in this case, they were
not living together, dependency is not established
unless something tending to show dependency,
in addition to the legal duty of the husband, is
shown.
''In 28 R.'C.L. 771, it is said:

" 'The pur:pos,e of the: st1atute is to P''novide
the workman~s dep~en:went in future wit!h som.ethitng iJn substitution for, wh1at has been lost by
the workman's de1at:h, and, consequently to establish dependency the a·p;plicant for compensation
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n1ust sho'v that he or she had reasonable grounds
to anticipate future support from the decedent.
This reasonable expectation of continuing or future support and 1naintenance seems to be the
true criterion as to who are dependents.'
'·And, at page 773:
" 'If the applicant for compensation is unaided by the statutory presumption of dependency, he must present proof of the fact. Among
the principal indicia of the state of dependency
may be mentioned the legal obligation of support;
the fact that contributions have been made in the
past; the fact that the applicant has taken some
action in anticipation of future contributions, and
the fact that the applicant has no means of suppo~ in su'bstitution for the anticipated contributions of the deceased. It is not to he understood,
of course, that all of these elements must be
proven in any p~articular case; but it will he true
in a great majority of cases, though there will be
well defined exceptions, that contribution in the
past is an essential, as it is the most cogent, evidentiary fact in the proof of dep·endency. The
legal obligation of support, when considered
alone, will rarely, if ever, establish a state of
dependency, or give rise to a presumption that a
person is a dep·endent; but it may very well
strengthen a weak inference arising from small or
irregular contributions, or it may aid a promise of
future support. Where it appears that the legal
obligation had been neglected by the deceased immediately prior to his death, the issue of dependency must be resolved ordinarily with reference
to the duration of the period of non-support.'
''In cases where the employee upon whom the
legal duty of support rests has deserted his deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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pendents, and has wrongfully evaded or neglected
his obligation to them, it is a proper inquiry whether the facts and circumst·ances warrant the
reasonable p:robability that the legal obligation
would have been enforced in future. And it can
easily be supposed that when such reasonable
probability exists, a state of dependency, under
the statute, might be found.
"In the case at bar, to establish her dependency upon deceased, it was incumbent upon the
applicant to show not only that deceased owed
her that legal duty of sup-port, but that there was
a reasonable expectation that the duty would be
fulfilled; in o:thJer words, that the legal iobligat~on of support must b.e c·owrplle~d wit:h suc'h othe.r
facts 1amd circumstamces as vo: w1a~t the ·reas~ovn.
able probability that such obligatWovn would be
p·erfo·rmed. ''
In the earlier case of Utah-Apex Mining Co. vs.
Industrial Commission, 64 Utah 221, 228 Pac. 1078 (1924)'
the evidence showed that the de-ceased husband had left
his wife ·and failed to support her from D·ecemher 1918
until October, 1923, when the accident occurred which
caused his death. ·The ·claimant Wife not only had received no ~unds during this time· from deceased, but was
in necessitous circumstances and receiving alms. from
the county poor fund. The commission's award based
upon a finding of dependency was annulled upon the
ground that no dependency existed.
·The court at page 1080, went to considerable length
to discuss the matter of the financial condition of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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claimant and to point out that it has little if any bearing on the question of dependency:
"'In Honnold, Workmen's Comp. vol. 1, See.
· 70, p. 224, the author, discussing the question as
to who are dependents, says:
'It may be said in general terms that
a ''dependent'' is one who looks to another
for support, one depen9-ent upon another
for the ordinary necessities of life for a
person of his class and· position.'
''Further on, in the same section, at page
225, the author continues:
'It follows that dependency does not
depend on whether the alleged dependents
could support themselves without decedent's earnings, or so reduce their expenses that they would be supported independent of his earnings, but on whether
they were in fact supported in whole or
in part by such earnings under circumstances indicating an intent on the part
of the deceased to furnish such support.'
"In Dosker's Manual of ·Compensation Law,
at page 19·4, the author, quoting from a Connecti-·
cut ease, says :

'A dependent under the act is not necessarily one to whom the contributions of
the injured or deceased workman are necessary to his or her support. The test is
whether the contributions were relied upon
by the dependent for his or her means of
living.' ''
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Plaintiff has cited in support of his position the
case of McGarry vs. Industrial ·Commission, ·63 Utah
811, 222 Pac. 592 (192'3), and 6'4 Utah 592, ·2~3.2, Pac. 1090
(192:5). The case is readily distinguishable since it involved a deserted infant seven years old, and the c·o'Yir
cealment. by the deceased father of his whereabouts,
coupled with an actual dependency. This court in the
Utah-Apex Mining ·Co. case of 192'4, supra, distinguished
the facts of the first McGarry decision in the opinion,
and ·pointed out the unusual features of the McGarry
case. Also in the Utah-Apex Mining Case of 1926, supra,
the court again commented on the McGarry case as follo,vs, page H59, Pacific Reporter:
1

''In this state of facts we are compelled to
conclude that there was no proof, aside from the
legal obligation of deceased, upon which to base
the conclusion that there was a reasonable expectation of future sup,port by the deceased. ·This
conclusion is not opposed to what was said or decided in McGarry v. Ind. Com., which was twice
before this court. 22.2 P. 592, H3 Utah, 81; 2'32
P. 1090, ·6'4 Utah, '592, 3.9 A.L.R. 306. 'That case
involved the claim of a minor child, seven years
of age, whose father had deserted it, and left for
parts unknown, and concealed his whereabouts
and identity for two or three years and until his
death. This court decided that it was further
shown that the ·child was actually dependent; that
the peculiar and exceptional circumstances present would support a finding that the: child was a
dependent of its father, within the meaning of
the statute. The lactwal mBp'endency of the child,
its lack of leg,al c.a.p,acity to ass.ert or waive its
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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'

legal ,right tto suppor.t front its fa.th.er, and the
conduct of the father in concealing himself to
avoid his legal duty are features which clearly
distinguish that case from the one under review.
In Utah -4:\.pex l\1in. Co. v. Ind. Com., 228 P. 1078,
6-! Utah, 221, the clahn of a vvife to be adjudged
a dependent ''Tas denied. The parties had lived
apart for four years, during which time the husband had made no contributions to his wife's support. She testified that her husband had left her,
and that she did not expect him to come back or
to support her or furnish her with any financial
assistance. In each of lhe oases last Cl~tie:d t'hte.re
was present the leg,al obligat~ion of su.pv1ovr:t, arnd
the ultimate test in ieach case w·as the p1"obability

of futur,e support.''
Plaintiff has also cited the case of Utah Fuel C:ompany vs. Industrial Commission, 80 Utah 301, 15 P. ('2·nd)
297 (19'32), and quotes from that opinion relative to the
basis for dependency ·as being established solely upon a
need plus a legal duty. The case does not involve the
dependency of a wife legally separated from her husband, but minor children. Adherence to the rule of the
previous Utah decisions was contained in the statement
of the court at page 2·98 as follows:
''The decisions of the courts in this country
and in England are practically un-animous in holding in cases where dependency rests on facts, not
presumption, that a finding of dependency cannot rest alone on proof of relationshipi of the·
parties, but that, in addition thereto, there must
be introduced in evidence some facts showing
that the right to support has some practical value.
The minimum requirement ·is that there must be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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shown a r.ea.sonable p't1ob,abilit:y t'hat the ob~igation
of the parent will be fulfilled. Glaze v. Hart, 2·25
Mo. App. 1205, 3'6 ·S.W. '(2d) '684; ·Oeean Accident
& Guarantee ·Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 32
Ariz. 54, 255 P. 598 ; Id., 34 Ariz. 17'5, 269 P. 77 ;
Young v. Niddrie & Benhar Coal Co., Ltd., 603
B.W.C.C. 744. :see cases cited in ·McGarry v. Industrial ~Commission, 63 Utah 81, ·2:22 P. :592; Id.,
·64 Utah 592, 23.2 P. 1090, 39 A.L·.R. 306. ·The rule
is state.d by Mr. Justice Cherry in Utah-Apex
Mining ·Company v. Industrial Commission, 66
Utah '529, 244 ·P. 656-, S:57, as follows: 'In cases
where the employee upon whom the legal duty
of support rests has deserted his dependents, and
has wrongfully evaded or neglected his obligation
to them, it is a proper inquiry whether the facts
and circumstances warrant the reasonable ·probability that the legal obligation would have been
·enforced in future. ..A.nd it cW'n easily b·e swpvpiO'S'ed
that w·hen svuch reasonable vp'roba:bility lexists, a
state of dependency, under the statute, might be
found.'''

The ease of Diaz vs. Industrial !Commission, 80 Utah
7'7, 13 P. '('2.nd) 307 (1932) from which the plaintiff quotes
at length has no relevancy to the facts of the case before
the Commission. ~The ·court itself summarized the evidence to point out this distinction, at page ·312:
''Here the parties lived together for ·eleven
years, during all of which time the ap·plicants
looked to the deceased for sup·port and maintenance, and were supported and maintained by
him. When the deceased left Dividend and went
to Butte, there is no substantial com·petent evidence to show nor to justify an inference tha.t
such family relation was not to continue or that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by mutual consent it "\Vas so changed that the deceased no longer was required to perform his legal
and moral obligation to support the applicants,
or that they no longer 'vere to be supported by
him, or no longer expected to receive sup·port
from him, and that they from thence on were
required to shift for themselves without aid from
the dHceased. We do not see anything in the
record to justify ·any such inference or conclusion. None such is justified, because the parties
lived apart from each other for about a year and
a half, about one year of which the deceased was
in Butte. Further, the evidence shows that during the time he was in Butte he and his wife· corresponded with each other, and that she received
moneys from him, and, when he returned to Dividend, they visited each other, and on such occasions he also gave her money for the sup~port of
herself and of the minor child.''
No other logical conclusion could he drawn from that
evidence, but that there was a distinct probability of
support and maintenance, and the court very carefully
pointed out the contributions and close relationship· of
the parties which made this so. The mere fact that hy
a mutual arrangement of the parties there is. at the instant of death a temporary separation with no active
support should not deny compensation and a finding of
dependency in and of itself. A husband may have left
his family to establish a home elsewhere, as the court
indicates, yet they may be dependent u·pon him. Why~
Because under such circumstances they may antieip·ate
the probability of future support. The very quotation
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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from page 311 set forth by. plaintiff, citing from a Pennsylvania case, makes this clear.
'' ... Where the separation is merely for the
mutual convenience of the parties, and the wife
is dependent, and the obligation to support her
is either recognized or performed, the mere fact
that the husband, for any reason, fails to perform
that duty for a time, does not deprive the wife of
her status as a de-pendent.... ''
The decision also cites the case of Merrill vs. Penasco
Lumber Co., 204 Pac. 72 ('1922), and plaintiff cites this
case in her brief. It is the same type of :case as the Diaz
case, and falls within an entirely distinct category than
that with which we are here concerned. These cases do
not in any sense modify the rule established that the
true criterion of dependency, absent statutory presumption, is the reasonable probability of future support.
In general, it is 'believed that the Utah decisions
provide adequate authority for the proper determination
of the question of dependency. It is deemed advisable,
however, to comment briefly on the Pennsylvania decisions in plaintiff's brief, since they have been cited. Th~
case Urban v. Nanticoke ·city, 169 Atl. 46'6 (Pa. 1933),
is clearly distinguishable. There the wife had been confined to a mental hospital, supported by public authorities, for many years, and while no actual payment had
been made for the eleven years prior to death, the decision very carefully pointed out that the wife had been
paroled to her husband for varying periods during her
overall st·ay in the ho·spital, that he visited his wife on
1
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holidays during the period, that he had p,romised to pay
the public authorities on several occasions when he· h·ad
funds to do so, and that he had promised to take care
of his 'vife whenever she was released. In view of these
factors, the court viewed dependency as established.
In Binkley vs. ~Stone & Webster Engineering ,c·orporation, 40 ·A. 2d 1'32 '(Pa. 1944) the distinguishing factor, and the core of the decision, was stated ·at :page 134:
'''The conclusion of the board was: 'Under
the circumstances, she did all she could reasonably be expected to do. Her failure to receive
payments on the support order was due to decedent's evasion of his obligation and the intentional ooncealment of his where-abouts. Wie· can
presume that har!J cZaimaJnt known where her husband was employed legal p~r.ocess W'ovuld Jvave ·p~no
duced oompliance w·ith the order .r1md payme?Vt of
mo"Y/Je·y to claimam.t.' ''
There is no factor of concealment whatsoever in the
case before the court.
In Dupree vs. Monroe ·Sand & Gravel Co., 18 So.
2d 845 ('La. 19'43), a wife was held not to he a dependent
where there was an extended separation without contribution by her husband.
In considering the facts of the instant case against
the background of applicable law, it is again noted that
a decision of the Industrial ·Commission may not he disturbed unless the court finds that the ~Commis·sion arbitrarily, and ·capTiciously disregarded the evidence or unSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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reasonably refused to believe competent, substantial, and
m-aterial evidence.
It is impossible to see in the case a scintilla of evidence upon which any expectation of future support ·could
be predicated. The parties had been separated for 11
years at the time of death and during that entire p=eriod
plaintiff had received only $200 or $225, and had received
nothing wh!atsoever during the last five years of tha~
period. During at least the eight or nine years prior to
death, deceased had been working at the same job for
Clayton Investment Company in Salt Lake City, Utah
('Tr. 29, 30). There was no concealment whatsoever.
·The factor of past contribution, therefore, which
as has been pointed out is one of the prime- factors in
considering the question of dependency, is ·almost completely lacking. It is true that there is a legal duty
existant, 'but as the court above has indicated, this. duty
cannot itself create dependency. Moreover, that duty
in this case is a narrow one since it is not the broad
duty of a husband to support a wife, but th·at of a separate maintenance decree providing for the payment of
only $2·5.00 per month. The cases cited above conside·r
the dependency of husband and wife, but the p·arties in
this case were not husband and wife since separate
maintenance is a specie of divorce.
'The actual need of the plaintiff is itself and in many
respects a matter of conjecture. At p·age 7'6 of the
transcript ap·pears the following:
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"Q. Were you at the time of the death of
Mr. Llewelyn dependent on him for your support
and maintenance?
''A. Well, yes, I was. Of ·course, I worked
all the time steady.''
And at page 77:
'' Q. During the past thirteen years have
you at anytime lived with your husband~

"A. No.
''Q. Have you been working during that
timet
''A. Yes, I worked off and on all the time.''
This last answer is interesting in that an attemp·t
was made to show that plaintiff h·ad not worked for a
few months prior to the date of death, yet this answer
indicates that the employment during the- years of separation had been sporadic and carries the clear imp,lication that there were intervals when no work was performed. Again, as the courts above have pointed out,
need alone cannot form the basis of creating a dep·endency. If that principle were established and dependency
determined by the financial status of the alleged dependent, in cases where a family had sufficient means
to continue living in the proper station of life, they
could not be classed as dependents even though deceased had actually contributed regular and substantial
amounts during his lifetime to their support. 'This is
clearly not the law, and the courts have uniformly held
to the contrary.
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In conclusion, it is submitted that the Commission
has given a fair and impartial consideration to all of
the evidence before them, and has prop1erly decided that
no -actual dependency existed. There is nothing in the
record to indicate that the 'Commission arbitrarily and
0ap-riciously disregarded or unreasonably refused to believe any of the evidence, and the. de·cision should be
affirmed.

The determination of the existence of a casual
connection between the accidental injury and the
death of deceased.
At the outset of the brief, it was indicated that the
defendant did not acquiesce in the finding that the injury
sustained by the deceased was the actual cause of death,
and the details of this p·rotest were set forth in the
answer to the petition for rehearing '(Tr. 17). While
we believe the finding must be sustained if there is competent and material evidence in the record to support
it, whether or not there is conflict in that evidence, we
also believe an examination of the medical testimony
discloses that ·all of the Ciompetent ·evidence is to the contrary.
Statement of facts as to the causal connection
between injury and death.
Isaiah J. Llewelyn, age 62., was employed .bY the
Clayton Investment Comp-any as a fireman at a heating
plant of that company in S-alt Lake City, Utah on December 1, 19~6. CTr. 28). On that date he jumped off an
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elevation about two feet high, and onto a ptiece of coal
lying on the floor belo,v, injuring his left foot, which
pained him on top of the instep and down the inside.
(Tr. 32). He 'vas removed to his room in the Wilson
Hotel, and Dr. J. J. Galligan was called (Tr. 82). H·e
was removed the same date to the Holy Cross Hospital,
where an examination of the lower leg showed a severe
sprained ankle ~d incomplete fracture of the heel bone
called the oscalcis, together with some stripping of the
tips of the malleoli (Tr. 82). He remained in the hospital until Janu·ary 27, 1947, and during this time was
attended by Dr. Galligan who saw him nearly every
day and sometimes twice a day (Tr. 82). Mrs. H. K.
·Coolican saw him in the hospital on December 10, and
stated that the foot was swollen and discolored nearly
to the knee (Tr. 83), and that substantially the same
condition prevailed on December 27 (Tr. '34). D·eceased
was examined when he first went to the hospital, and
at subsequent times, and in addition to the injury also
had high blood pressure, an enlarged heart and a record
of infection in his left leg one year prior to admission
{'Tr. 84), and hypertension (Tr. 90). Upon admission
he had an enlarged and swollen ankle joint and lower
leg with tenderness over the heel {Tr. 84).
Dr. Galligan treated the patient during the first hospitalization, and did not see him more than once or twice
thereafter ( Tr. 86). He testified that such a fracture
is unusual (Tr. 88), and tha:t emboli (which immediately
caused the death) usually occur immediately after the
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InJury (Tr.. 89'). The p·eriod of hospitalization at that
point was a normal period for injuries of that typ·e CT·r.
9'1).
About January 25, 1947, deceased. left the hospital
and returned to the Wilson hotel (Tr·. 35), transferring
to his daughter's home on F·ebruary 7, 1947 ('Tr. 36),
where he remained until March 11, 1947 ('Tr. 106), on
which date he returned to the hospital, and died there
March 27, 19'47. His daughter testified that the leg was
swollen and dis·colored on February 7, and on February
9, pain traveled up his thigh (Tr. 38), moving into back
on F·ebruary 22 (Tr. 39). While he went to bed on February 7, he was up and around the house at intervals
until February ·22 tTr. 48).
Dr. Bruce R. Pearson first saw deceased on February 26, 1947 (Tr. 105) at the request of ·Dr. Galligan
and was the attending physician from that date until
time of death. His examination disclosed acute congestive heart failure which was treated with digitalis,
and when that was under control he found a severe infection of the urinary tract ('Tr. 106). ;The heart condition was unquestionably of many years standing and
the urinary infection had existed for ~pproximately two
or three years (Tr. 107}. The patient was aware of the
symptoms of these diseases, but as a layman did not
appreciate the specific nature of his illness tTr. 107).
Dr. Pearson stated that the immediate cause of
death was recurrent pulmonary embolism of about 1'6
days duration ('Tr. 119) due to chronic vascular disease
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(Tr. t19), and this was one of the causes put down on
the death certificate by hin1 ('Tr. 111). There had been
a major embolisn1 on ·March 15 and again on March 23
(Tr. 11'5). Dr. Pearson testified that pulmonary emboli
are most commonly caused by infection, disease, nutritional causes and blood clotting (Tr. 112), and·also that
one of the least causes is traumatic injury (Tr. 120).
If the cause is traumatic, the importance of the time
element was clearly set forth at page 120 of the transcript:

'' Q. And if from some traumatic injury pulmonary emboli is formed, how soon after the
injury normally do these emboli reach the heart
and cause death~
''A. ·The emboli-the vascular blood clot
occurs immediately; that is, very mu·ch of a clot
in an injured vessel occurs immediately following
an injury, and if embolism is going to occur it
will occur in most instances before the reparative
process. That is scar tissue formation that takes
place in the clots has had an opportunity to
occur. That takes place quite rapidly, so that
generally speaking from a traumatic injury we
would expect any emboli phenom·ena to occur
immediately. That is, within a period of a few
days. Certainly within a period of three weeks
ought to give anything that is going to occur,
ample time to completely heal.''
And at page 122, 123 of the transcript:

'' Q. Wh·en the emboli form, they hang on
the inside of the vessel. They are not formed
while moving, .are they'
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''A. No, but once an embolus is formed and
then there is ·an inflammatory process sets up
within 24 to 48 hours. They just don't hang there
and not do anything.

'·' Q. They would not be moving through the
vessels until they had broken away~
"'·A. 'That is right. According to our conCe'pt of it, an embolus must break away and enter
the circulatory system sometime within twentyfour to forty-eight ·hours after it is first formed.
Otherwise it will be fixed and permanent to the
vein by this inflammatory re·action.

'·' Q. You say it would he fixed and permanent~

''A. Yes.
'' Q. It could be formed in a permanent status, and later on it might break loose~

''A. No, that is not the situation. When
fibrous tissue sets in, the clot becom,es an integral
part of the vein wall.''
D:r. Pearson testified ·as to -his opinion of the cause
of death and its possible conneetion with the injury sustained. At page 119 of the transcript he stated:

'' Q. In your opinion was the injury to the
left foot which was an incomplete fracture of the
os ealcis and sprain of the left foot, was that, in
your opinion, in any way the immediate caus-H of
his death~
''A. I can't see any connection whatsoever.
'' Q. In other words, the injury to the patient's left leg had no conneetion, direct or: otherwise, to the immediate cause of death~
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'' ~~.

In my opinion, definitely no.''

Again at page 108:

''Q. Now, doctor, from your original examination and your subsequent treatment and your
care and consideration of Mr. Llewelyn's case,
did you form an op·inion as to what was the ·cause
of death1
''A. I did.
'' Q.

What was your opinion 1

"A. I felt that the generalized cardio-vascular renal disease was the p-rincipal cause of
death, and that that was complicated by .a long
history of chronic alcoholism, malnutrition and
infection of the urinary tract.''
Dr. Pearson also qualified the testimony of the family of deceased relative to the condition of the leg when
deceased was taken to the hospital in March. He stated
the leg was slightly trophic, without evidence of edema
or swelling, and while stating there was discoloration,
he deemed it to have come from old venous varicosities
(Tr. 121). Also on February 27, there were pigmentary
scars from ulcers on the shin, hut no other discoloration
(Tt. 124).
Dr. Leslie B. White was called as an expert witne·ss
by plaintiff and the major portion of his testimony was
directed to qualification, with the exception of a hypothetical ·question and his answer CTr. 6"9}. He had never
seen or treated the deceased ( Tr. 60).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24

ARGUMENT
··.~

Based upon the medical testimony, there can be no
doubt that the attending doctor, Pearson, was of the very
definite and strong opinion that the injury did not cause
or contribute to the death of deceased. The testimony
of Dr. Galligan is not in conflict with this, particularly
in view of the fact that he did not see the piatient, except
once or twice at the home of the ·daughter, after the
release from the hospital from the first period of hospitalization on January 25, 1947.
Dr. White, however, did indicate a causal connection between the injury and death. The focus of inquiry,
therefore, must center on the only hypothetical question
asked, and the answer of Dr. White. The question and
answer follow ('Tr. '69) :
Doctor, I will ask you to assume the
following facts to be true: :That on the 1st of
December, 194·6, Mr. Llewelyn, a man of •62 years
was in good health and he stumbled and fell and
fractured the plantar aspect of the os calcis of
the left foot. That Mr. Llewelyn was confined to
his bed in a hospital from D·ecember 1, 1946 to
January 25, 1947, and on this later date he was
released from the hospital improved but still suffering extremely from a sore, swollen and very
discolored left leg and foot. That Mr. Llewelyn
could not stand with his foot lowered 'because
of the extreme pain, and that he was unable to
hear any weight on his leg and could only move
about with the aid of crutches. That Mr. Llewelyn
suffered no other injury, but on February 7, 1947,
he was stricken with a pain in the calf of his
'' Q.
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left leg; that this pain seemed to progress UJli the
left leg into the thigh and from the thigh into
the side, and finally lodging in his hack on February 22, 1947; that after this later date Mr.
Llewelyn was unable to get out of bed; that on or
about March 14 the first of a series of emboli
passed through Mr. Llewelyn's pulmonary veins
and on March 21 Mr. Llewelyn died, and the diagnosis was recurrent pulmonary embolism of sixteen days duration. Now Doctor, based on your
experience as a physician and surgeon, do you
have an opinion as to the source and ·cause of
the emboli th-at was the immediate cause of Mr.
Llewelyn's death? ' '
(Discussion by Counsel)

'' Q. Answer whether you have an opinion
based on your experience.

''A. Yes.
'' Q.

What is your opinion, doctor'

''A. My opinion is that-from the hypothetical question quoted- that there had been
some damage to the vessels to the foot or calf of
the leg which formed a thrombosis in the great
vessels of the leg, either the popliteal or femoral
vein. 'The clot would not necessarily block the
entire vein, but it lodged there free, and after
a given length of time it was jarred loose and
went into the general circulation and carried up
through the heart to the lung, and that the pulmonary embolus was the immediate cause of
death. ·There may have been other factors, I don't
know."
It will be noted that the answer itself is very careful to limit itself to the hypothetical question, for the
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Doctor says ''from the hypothetical question quoted''
and also ''' There may have been other factors, I don't
know." The difficulty with the hyp:othetical question,
however, is that it omits entirely the very factors which
Dr. Pearson had listed as the cause of death. Dr. Pearson had testified that emboli are caused by a number of
conditions, listing disease as. the most frequent cause
and traumatic injury as the most infrequent. All of the
medical testimony indicates, howe:ver, that emboU are
created by a specific cause, and apparently are not created by the body without that cause. The pToblem confronting Dr. White in the question was that of a man in
'' g~olo~d he1a~th,'' who sustained an injury which produced
symptoms of pain and discolor, and who died from an
emboli. Under the question there was only one possible
source for the emboli, and that was the injury. Nothing
else was p·resent which could have caused it. Dr. White
does not in final analysis contradict the testimony of Dr.
P·earson that an emboli usually occurs, when caused by
injury, immediately thereafter and not to exceed three
weeks. The testimony of Dr. White may well have viewed
the injury as possibly causing death simply because the
immediate cause of death was known and there was no
other conceivable source for the immediate cause exce·pt that injury. Had the Doctor been properly advised
and the question adequately framed to show that deceased was suffering from generalized cardio-vascular
renal disease, complicated by a long history of chronic
alcoholism, malnutrition and infection of the urinary
tract, his answer might well have been identical with
1
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that of Dr. Pearson. For these reason;s it is, submitted
that there is in reality no competent contradiction of
Dr. Pearson, and therefore no testimony upon which
the finding of the Commission that the injury caused the
death could be predicated.

In conclusion it is submitted that the decision of
the Commission denying compensation should be affirmed, not only upon the ground that there was no dependency in this case, but upon the further ground th·at
there was no casual connection between the injury and
the death.
E~L
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